




The “Hobbesian turn” is an invention out of whole cloth, a device by 
which to oppose the usually supposed autonomy of the aesthetic, 
the moral, the political, and the factual; to recover the collective 
holism of civilizational (or enlanguaged cultural) life; to feature the 
existential historicity of the human career, which is incompatible 
with any strict universalism and all the forms of transcendentalism; 
hence, also, to feature the adequacy of a contingent Lebensform 
in collecting the affinities of creative expression and agentive 
commitment within the terms of human solidarity; to abandon strict 
universality and necessary synthetic truths; and to favour the fluxive 
world of pragmatist construction rather than the indemonstrable 
fixities of rationalism and transcendentalism. The article proceeds 
largely by examining aspects of Picasso’s career and the history 
of Western politics spanning the sixteenth century to the present.
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I read Hobbes initially as the most strategically placed theorist 
of Western political history; and I take the vocabulary of Western 
political philosophy to have become the vocabulary of global 
politics – which is not to suppose that the West will dominate the 
political history of the future.1 I’m inclined to doubt that it will. 
I’m persuaded, rather, that we are entering the third phase of a 
perfectly legible history of distinctly modern politics – fraught 
with more than ordinary danger – that, from the sixteenth century 
to the present, has already passed through two prolonged phases 
distinctive of the West: absolute monarchy and a variety of 
republican replacements; and is now poised for a third phase that 
doubtless will borrow in a fresh way elements drawn from the first 
two phases, now embedded and emboldened in global politics, that 
may (or may not) be able to leaven the deepening insecurities of 
our technologized world, which everyone has good reason to fear. 
My own rather dismal prophecy (I sincerely hope I’m mistaken) 
is that we are likely to favour one or another form of totalitarian 
closure and security – within the bounds of which what is usually 
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called democratic socialism would have been a welcome option 
but which I doubt is likely to prevail. Here, we find an enlarged 
need for conjectural options that have come to be called “social 
imaginaries”: imminent possibilities of political practice, to be 
precise, drawn from incompletely resolved past insecurities rather 
than deemed now to be foundationally valid – prudent (in Hobbes’ 
careful sense) more than demonstrably correct in any moral or 
constitutional way.2
There is, I concede, no single correct use of the expression, 
“social imaginary” and no assured political prophecy but increased 
insecurity.3 My own preference, here, is noticeably shallow, though 
not unrepresentative or inapt, or unwilling to yield to deeper or 
more explicit dispositions. In fact, my untutored guess is that cyber 
technology will assuredly play an increasingly important, partially 
invisible role, in generating new forms of collective insecurity and 
in protecting us from same – which suggests the possible congruity 
of totalitarian options. Seventeenth-century monarchy and 
eighteenth- and nineteenth-century democracy and republicanism 
may have suited the prominence of various sorts of individualism 
that are now being altered or displaced. If so, then there may be 
a deceptively valid token politics in my conjecture. And if that 
proves true, then I’m prepared to believe that it will affect artistic, 
interpretive, and other civilizational sensibilities conformably.
To my knowledge, no one has discussed the Hobbesian 
aesthetic – as distinct from the Hobbesian politic, which I myself 
advance with some misgiving, since I take it to be a placeholder for 
innumerable substitutions of an entwined account of the political 
and the aesthetic, that I have yet to draft satisfactorily. I treat 
responsive expression (as in the arts) and responsive commitment 
(as in politics) as very similar to one another (interpretively) – in 
terms of the logic of judgment and argument, as well as in being 
closer to what is thoroughly existential in human life than what is 
usually urged, say, in executive inquiries regarding morality and 
the natural sciences. That, however, I concede, may be no more 
than a personal impression, though it has the effect of demoting 
the would-be autonomy of moral and factual questions. I treat the 
primacy of the existential as a factual or ontological discovery – not 
the cognitive yield of a privileged faculty.
In any event, the two sorts of inquiry appear to converge in their 
preference for genre-like and prototypical or analogical forms of 
inference: highly informal, ad hoc, opportunistic, context-bound; 
unquestionably contingent though logically fortified in drawing 
on the latent inferential features of mundane discourse itself; 
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most successful in ordinary and familiar, even if specialized, 
exchanges, but as averse to settled forms of constitutionalism as 
its predecessors. 
In reading Hobbes under the shadow of the remarkable glosses 
provided by figures that belong to our own time, visionary figures 
like Carl Schmitt and perhaps Giorgio Agamben, whose political 
guesses, I must admit, are unpleasantly close to my own – or 
mine to theirs,4 I mean to feature at least four linked but distinct 
convictions that are largely settled, factually, as far as the political 
side of the story is concerned, and that prove at least as instructive 
when approached in aesthetic terms or (at an even deeper level of 
analysis) “existentially” (as I prefer to say) – which I associate with 
a reconceptualization of pragmatism: first, then, the ontological 
primacy of flux over fixity, which, applied to the human world 
or to human cognition, takes the unique and ineluctable form of 
historicity: that’s to say, the benign scepticism that reminds us 
that we always exceed, by temporal extension, (mere history) the 
evidentiary sources of past cognition, without ever reaching the 
end of time or necessary truths about the world (that can never 
be overturned); second, historicity itself, the primal theme of 
the existentiality of specifically human life (as expression and 
commitment), that signifies the impossibility of any strictly 
rationalist or transcendentalist (totalized) closure applied to the 
world we claim to inhabit – inasmuch as transcendentalism is no 
more than a species of rationalism committed to the necessary or 
apodictic systematicity of the whole of reality (as, most notably, in 
Husserl’s Crisis volume,5 though also in Kant); third, the discovery 
that the contract theory of political legitimation (nominally, 
Hobbes’ theory), said to ensure sovereignty, constitutionality, the 
rule of law, and similar normative constraints deemed conceptually 
unavoidable, which is itself a futile regress (already known to 
Hobbes), since the stipulated “state of nature” is never rightly 
overcome or displaced (constructively) but only paradoxically 
installed within the bounds of Leviathan itself – thereby obscuring 
the deeper truth that political order (however, or if ever, legitimated) 
may be unconditionally risked (beyond all would-be legitimative 
measures) by proclaiming what, following Hobbes, both Schmitt 
and Agamben are prepared to affirm as “a state of exception” said to 
threaten or defeat the mortal existence and viability of whatever we 
might otherwise claim to have constructed, contractually, as a valid 
state (the explicit purpose of Hobbes’ contract); and, fourth, the 
increasingly intractable dangers and insecurities that uniquely mark 
our contemporary world – largely of our own making, but potentially 
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unmanageable and fearsome, existentially primary in the face of 
the dwindling assurances of conventional norms (monarchical, 
republican, democratic, liberal) – that may indeed begin to count as 
permanent “states of exception,” likely to be thoroughly lawless (in 
the rationalist sense), very possibly incoherent as well, and at the 
same time totalitarian in intent (a thoroughly unpalatable mixture). 
Nevertheless, I think we may be approaching just such a juncture now 
– which will require its own aesthetic. Count that a “real imaginary,” 
by which artistic expression and interpretive response (existentially 
informed) never fail to reflect the perceived human condition.
We continue, of course – we must continue – to speak of 
sovereignty, constitutionality, and their successors; but we must 
also confess we lack a fully articulated fluxive alternative to 
the demands of rationalism and transcendentalism. (We cannot 
continue as before). There is a recuperative practice to be reclaimed, 
but it’s admittedly difficult to define or trust. Nevertheless, I 
find an unlikely but thoroughly plausible and promising clue, 
avant la lettre, in (of all places) the evolving aesthetic of the mid-
nineteenth-century revolution in the arts, in France, roughly post-
Manet and Baudelaire, that, intertwined with the politics of liberty, 
spontaneously promoted something akin to what I’m calling 
the Hobbesian aesthetic: the fulfilment of the liberty of artistic 
expression in the form of the liberty of political commitment – the 
imaginary of the French Revolution – delayed through the end of 
the nineteenth century and the end of the first World War. Frankly, 
I regard the option as politically unavoidable and also – if I may say 
so – as an option implicitly celebrated in the revolution of modern 
Western painting just mentioned. I pursue the suggestion briefly – 
for its promise – chiefly in terms of Picasso’s compelling career. 
The paper itself lies in two halves not yet adequately joined. 
My first two dicta provide for the defeat of classic rationalism and 
transcendentalism (chiefly directed against Kant), which I address 
in the second half of the paper. The other two dicta identify the 
paradoxes that confront the Hobbesian aesthetic itself, which 
we must find a way of resolving, and which I explore, as I say, 
tentatively, by way of some notes regarding Picasso’s adventurous 
practice as a very early twentieth-century expression of the same 
mid-nineteenth-century artistic revolution that continues to evolve 
beyond the enthusiasms of Picasso’s time. I begin to address these 
puzzles in the first half of the paper, guided by the precept that we 
must match the courage of the new liberty of artistic expression 
(already beyond its first hundred years) with a comparable 
courage suited to a political commitment capable of resolving the 
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threatening paradoxes of our actual political situation. My intention 
is to strengthen the existential and historied nature of our aesthetic 
responses, which is at best a second thought in Kant’s account.
Now, quite suddenly – I confess I had no inkling of the impending 
event – the highly-regarded American Constitutional lawyer and 
theorist, Lawrence Tribe, has just reversed himself on the key puzzle 
of the logic and legality of impeaching the American President, 
which, on my reading, unmistakably points the way to preferring 
the insuperable informality of any ultimate law of nations and 
states, whether ratified in written form or not – a scandal, to be sure, 
if judged by Hans Kelsen’s lights.6 Kelsen insists that there must be 
a Gründnorm for every properly formed state, but he cannot find it, 
even under Max Weber’s prodding. (Tribe does not mention Kelsen 
or Weber in his book).
If I understand Tribe correctly, there cannot be an explicit 
(closed) formulation of the grounds for either indicting (criminally) 
or impeaching (politically) a democratically elected American 
President: either practice would produce an all-but-permanent chaos 
of the order of “a state of exception.” (This is, of course, no more than 
my gloss on Tribe’s televised statement of May 19, 2018, in advance of 
any reading of his actual text – now published).7 But, thus far at least 
(in a way that does not depend on Tribe’s further argument, or the 
vagaries of local constitutional conviction), I take Tribe’s statement 
to provide sufficient grounds for a gratuitous endorsement of my 
own thesis: that’s to say, the key to my replacement of a thoroughly 
rationalist politics by an unblinking pragmatist alternative. I’m 
persuaded that, once we admit historicity, this becomes the only 
way by which to disallow the conceptual embarrassments that fasten 
on such distinctions as “the state of nature,” “a state of exception,” 
“the rule of law,” “sovereignty,” and the would-be determinacy of 
“constitutionality.” We remain permanently at existential risk, if we 
(as we must) concede that the Head of State – paradigmatically, the 
Head of a well-formed democratic state – cannot fail to be open 
to both indictment and impeachment – but only on the strength of 
the ad hoc arguments of experienced political agents, speaking and 
acting in accord with their “form of life” – what I call a “second-best” 
solution, in the face of there being no privileged or determinate 
alternative. Such arguments are composed of duly “weighted 
valences” (or habitudes) of practice drawn, inferentially, from the 
entire Lebensform or Lebenswelt to which they are to be applied.8 
Foundational legal categories cannot be more than historied 
habitudes (approximative, open generalizations) drawn from 
practice and pertinent conviction. Modern historied democracies 
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cannot fail to be consensual; but their habitudes are known of 
course (with adequate certainty) by all those who participate in 
the political life of the state. There’s the point of the reductio of 
rationalism and transcendentalism, applied to the political (and, 
indeed, to every other existential engagement with the world). For 
cognate reasons, there are no rules among the fine arts or their 
interpretation. We live by habitudes rather than by rules. 
I have one further preliminary thought to add before actually 
beginning. If I’m right in starting this way, then my preamble 
should yield a pair of strong principles that may indeed justify 
the division and reconstituted unity of the paper’s two halves. The 
first principle should hold that historicity and either rationalism 
or transcendentalism – extended to the political world – are 
irreconcilable; hence, that, if, as I argue, historicity is itself an 
existential attribute of the human condition (that’s to say, an 
empirically confirmed fact about human cognition), then strict 
rationalism or transcendentalism must be, at once, self-contradictory 
– at once, unconditionally true and evidentially subject to the 
vagaries of historicity – which, if admitted, precludes all would-be 
apodictically necessary truths. This is indeed the fatal difficulty of 
Husserl’s Crisis volume. It is also, as I argue, unexpectedly opposed, 
in a decisive way, to Kant’s important but baffling Copernican turn 
(in the first Critique). My aim here is to recover the normal order 
of cognitive inquiry in every civilizational space: a state of play 
that deprives every political, interpretive, aesthetic impulse of any 
a priori privilege against totalitarian drift. Once conceded, it seems 
natural to invoke the Hobbesian aesthetic tentatively advanced in 
the first half of the paper. Let me start, again, here – though I have 
time for little more than an introductory foray.
I
My intuition is that political behaviour and the expression and 
interpretation of the artistic impulse are as close to the primal 
sources of purposive human life at its most existential that we 
could ever expect to isolate; and that, in spanning collective action 
and commitment and the public codification of our expressive 
responses to the human condition – artfully intertwined – we have 
indeed begun to occupy the “Hobbesian aesthetic.” This is already 
more than a guess, but, also, less than a theory. Goya, whom I more 
than admire, may be assuredly counted a compelling exemplar. 
But then, admitting more contrived modes of expression and the 
continual deflection of democratic energies, so, too, is the Picasso 
of early cubism and Les Demoiselles d’Avignon. At any rate, I have 
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no easy formula of the Hobbesian aesthetic: it’s merely one of a 
multitude of pertinent possibilities. What I offer, however, has 
the merit of favouring the holist unity of collective life, which 
standard philosophical theories of the moral and the aesthetic (the 
Kantian, preeminently) tend to ignore. The mere aggregation of 
individual lives neglects the political altogether; and the moral (at 
its most universal) tends to be bloodless, utopian, indifferent to 
sittlich origins, as well as distinctly ahistorical – which is to say, 
as indifferent to the existential as one can imagine. True language, 
I remind you, is inherently collective: the central meanings of its 
words and the meaning of all we can discern (say) and usefully 
interpret discursively in both the political world and the art world.
Cognition, I suggest, is not autonomous but existentially 
dependent at a deeper level of animal life than can be accounted for 
by way of the mastery of natural language. Language accounts for 
the paradigmatic role of discursive knowledge; but the absence of 
discursive concepts at the animal level (nearest the human) accounts 
(I suggest) for the existential enabling of the human infant’s 
capacity to master discursive concepts at all. That very ability must 
rely on innate and easily learned perceptual concepts (a Darwinian 
as well as an Aristotelian thesis, that neither Darwin nor Aristotle 
fathomed in the modern way): its most originary impulses (those 
of the evolving human self or person) must be suitably species-
wide but, also, artifactually (culturally) informed. I cannot see 
how a reasonable theory of interpretation – “civilizational,” 
as I’m inclined to say, rather than merely discretely aesthetic, 
legal, moral, historical, political, medical, or hermeneutic – can 
possibly be convincingly formulated if it does not begin with the 
primal intertwining of the political and the expressive. Hence, the 
fortunes of the theory of art and of the interpretation of artworks 
are undoubtedly inseparable from the fortunes of our theory of 
cognition itself. Animals – you will concede – never dispute about 
knowledge in the human way. Nevertheless, in the wild, they tend 
not to stray from their accustomed niches; and, already, there, one 
finds what seems to be the occasional perceptual incipience of the 
distinction between appearings and things that appear – a caution 
sometimes strengthened among animals that live with humans. (But 
I’ll refrain, here, if I may, from any Kantian or Hegelian reading of 
animal perception or conception).
I also find the disjunctive treatment of legal, aesthetic, political, 
cognitive, interpretive, theoretical, and practical judgments 
utterly unconvincing, counter-intuitive, in fact – especially as, 
on the condition given, cognition is itself existentially qualified, 
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primordially animal, inseparable from its well-known petitio and 
endless regress, insuperably contingent, no more than passingly 
reliable, approximatively diverse, abductive rather than fallible 
in any infinitist way.9 I regard this sort of construction as a proper 
glimpse of what pragmatism comes to in our time: a firmer but 
more concessive tolerance of what can never be brought to any 
asymptotic close. I take the human form of life to be uniquely 
historied or historicized (that is, the lives of selves or persons – 
not mere primates); and I hold that historied and rationalist (hence, 
also, transcendental) forms of cognition are simply incompatible. 
Hence, exceptionlessly universal, apodictic, unconditionally 
necessary truths beyond the analytic and the logical are never more 
than “stipulative” (in C.I. Lewis’ well-known sense) – which outstrips 
Kant’s first Critique easily enough. There are no synthetic a priori 
truths to be discovered. Truth and validity in the human world count 
as a distinctly modest but functionally adequate affair.
I’m persuaded that there are no ultimate rules of art or politics: 
whatever rules or norms there are, are already expressions of 
hegemonic power contending against the prevailing forces of 
practices (or habitudes) already in play. Occasionally, the very 
practice of painting, or the production of an arresting innovation in 
a particular canvas, unmistakably constitutes an originary political 
impulse that cannot be ignored. I take the stylistic alliance between 
Picasso and Braque for instance (confined to the artworld within 
which they jointly launched what we now call analytic cubism) to 
be, easily, the most daring and consequential political development 
of the early twentieth-century artworld, demonstrating how to 
combine politics and expressive innovation in a revolutionary 
way, in the form of an initially unexplained new canon. If we 
concede this much, then, by parity of reasoning, Picasso’s Les 
Demoiselles d’Avignon (of the same period: 1907) is an even bolder, 
almost explicitly political innovation, that signals (in the briefest, 
most perfunctory way) no more than Picasso’s seemingly remote 
affiliation with cubism (as well as with other such reminders). It 
dwells instead on quite another stunning bit of daring, which – if I 
understand what Picasso is up to – signals that perhaps no one but 
Picasso himself could have so brazenly favoured his “primitive” 
idiom in his “hegemonic” way. Every direct borrowing from the 
Demoiselles, by others, might easily betray itself too obviously to 
be allowed at all. Picasso’s feat is a singularity of sorts – addressed 
to the politics of ordinary life and of the artworld market – but it 
plainly rattled the artworld both politically and expressively.
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Observe, please, that, with the possible exception of the sculptured 
cubist head of Fernande – extraordinary feat – this was hardly 
true of cubism. That fact alone begins to explain how carefully 
– as in the preliminary studies for the Demoiselles – Picasso tests 
the extreme simplifications of his final images. The images are 
deliberately banalized in the Demoiselles, though in a thoroughly 
novel way: perfectly legibly, completely unadorned, gross but 
quiet enough, and yet unmistakably assertive and masterly, so 
that the horror of the brothel world cannot be denied and cannot 
be relieved, adumbrated (as it is) by the further banality of its 
unmarked “erasure.” How else could we have expressed the same 
charge memorably in any standard way? Imagine the Demoiselles 
hung beside a Renoir or a Matisse! Perhaps only Toulouse-Lautrec 
could have presented the brothel world compellingly with any 
approximative fidelity. My thought here is that the “aesthetic” 
I intend is little more than a preliminary conjecture meant to 
facilitate a speculation of a completely fresh sort. I wouldn’t be 
at all surprised if it eventually collected its initial intuitions in an 
entirely different spirit. I begin, then, with the straightforward 
sense that the commitments of political life and the expressiveness 
of the artworld may come closest to the existential pathos of the 
whole of our geistlich world, principally through the hegemonic 
powers of agency and expression – an idea not at all distant from 
the inevitable elevation of the Marxist “superstructure” to a level of 
motivational force outstripping the limitations of any merely class-
based ideology. Similarly, Picasso absorbs his offending category 
within the creaturely.
II
You must bear in mind that Braque, the shyer (but also, it seems, 
the more articulate of the two allies, who, together, launch cubism 
without much in the way of preliminary explanation), had himself 
submitted at least six cubist canvases of the 1908 l’Estaque series 
for the showing of the pending Salon d’Automne, only to have all 
of them rejected in one sweep, a move said to accord with Matisse’s 
influence and explicit contempt for the very idea of the new cubism, 
which Matisse addresses later in his own way. What Picasso and 
Braque make possible, however, is nothing less than a completely 
novel, all-purpose, two-dimensional schema (with its own third 
dimension) – to replace, hegemonically, all of the exhausted 
habits of so-called academic painting and whatever (justifiably or 
not) might be construed as tepid extensions of the older practice 
– impressionism, for one. Cubism appeared, in force, as if it had 
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had a longer inning than it actually had. It was not unknown or 
unanticipated, of course: one sees an essential intuition in Cézanne 
at least. But it descends all at once on the artworld (as a form of 
expressive liberty), as if from another planet, irresistibly; and it 
threatens the sufficiency – and barest order – of every other mode of 
expression by its mere presence. (You must imagine the historical 
setting and Picasso’s immense opportunism and daring).
The fact is, cubism did not need an explanation, once its master 
forms were displayed; but no multiplication of the artistic decisions 
that contrived the Demoiselles could quite capture what accounts 
for what commands our attention there. Each of these ventures 
exploits a hegemonic strategy, but of very different kinds. Cubism 
– Picasso’s as well as Braque’s – invites the fresh participation of 
the entire company of active painters of the day, as generously as 
possible: but not without displaying a sizable, seigneurial volume of 
commanding exemplars. Demoiselles confirms, more mysteriously, 
more privately, and, in another way altogether, Picasso’s solitary 
hegemony within the age. There’s a daring there – even a menace – 
that perhaps no other artist could have contested at the time; and 
very few could have fathomed even now. I would say, the ultimate 
theme of the Demoiselles was unconditional liberty – Picasso’s 
exuberance and creative moxie – overtaking even his treatment of 
the brothel theme. There’s Picasso’s use of the Hobbesian aesthetic 
at its most demanding: painting conceived as a political act of high-
wire confidence. Admittedly, a by-product of a deeper lesson.
Here, I would say, Picasso reveals himself as a subversive 
innovator, both in the cubist venture and in Demoiselles, though 
in very different ways. In the cubist work, Picasso (allied with 
Braque, who favours the elegance of the new style, which Picasso 
sets himself to master), contributes to the awesome volume and 
exuberance of the novel work that suddenly appears as a fait 
accompli. In Demoiselles, Picasso works quite studiously (in a 
seemingly incongruous style) to dampen the exposé of the brothel 
world – and succeeds in heightening its effect (and mystery). Picasso 
seems to have relished the first uncomprehending responses of the 
usual connoisseurs of his evolving forms (notably: Kahnweiler’s 
predictable uncertainty). The painting is hardly unfinished, of 
course, though some of its distinctive features – the use of the 
African masks, the vestigial still-life fruit at the foot of the canvas, 
the abrupt change of style from the left to the right side of the 
canvas, the hint of cubist interests, the near-sameness of two of the 
prostitutes’ faces staring at us (implicitly staring at them), and the 
implied awareness of the right-most figures with indecipherable 
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faces – cannot be said to be straightforwardly deciphered. I can 
even imagine an allusion to Las Meninas. That’s to say, I begin to 
grasp what a viewing of a Picasso (of this kind) might reasonably 
tolerate or require: something we might well be tempted to call an 
artistic “imaginary.” One often sees a treatment of an arm or a leg 
in a random Picasso that has appeared elsewhere in Picasso’s huge 
oeuvre, though without explicit linkage.
The Demoiselles is of course finished, but in a way that tolerates 
(even as it dares us to fathom) the disconnection of its deliberate 
oddities. And yet, the painting presents an unmistakable warning, 
and intensity and unity, that cannot be ignored. Indeed, its seeming 
scatter contributes to its rigor. Ultimately, I’d say it supports 
Leo Steinberg’s sense of the horror of the brothel (remarked in 
Steinberg’s essay, “The Philosophical Brothel”10); but it’s not easy 
to spell out just how the effect is produced. It’s also possible that 
its horror lies in the indifference with which it may be completely 
overlooked. But it also eclipses its nominal theme. It’s entirely 
inferential – visually. The tableau confronts us existentially, but not 
by any consensually explicit rule. The shorthand treatment of the 
figures, the opportunism of mingled styles, incongruities here and 
there, all conspire to draw our attention to the “political” judgment 
– perhaps, then, moral judgment as well, deliberately underplayed. 
Artistically, apart from the brothel theme, the abrupt use of the 
African forms seems to have baffled many – if not most – viewers. 
But that too, of course, is not irrelevant to our understanding of 
Picasso’s unique mastery. The lax mingling of expressive styles 
is not unlike an unrecorded conversation of different tongues 
among the unseen viewers of the scene: inevitably male. Picasso 
gives the impression of linking every possible expressive impulse 
displayed and every stylistic habitude to his own purpose. Imagine, 
for instance, reading the faded red and blue streaks at the sides of 
the canvas as part of the curtain held open by the woman on the left 
(with raised hand) and the seemingly continuous background white 
mid-space of the painting all but obscured by the images of the two 
(twinned) women themselves – perhaps then recalling (in one or 
another way) the national flag rendered as inexplicit as possible; 
but, once hinted, then rendered as well, as an extremely abstract 
indictment. Something less than an innuendo, let us say; but also, 
always, the effect of the sheer presence of Picasso at work and play 
in continental Europe.
Whatever may be found in the world – it may be said – makes 
its visual contribution to the chance unity of whatever construction 
or selection of things within the world we happen to favour. For 
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Picasso, there are no ultimate limits of expression or composition. 
And thus, there are no rules of closure to consult: not because of the 
opaque power of political or artistic genius (in any academic since), 
but because of the brute power of the expressive impulse itself – 
in Picasso’s eye and hand. Political and artistic invention require 
no rule (except perhaps dependently or instrumentally: that’s to 
say, derivatively, in order to ensure Picasso’s aesthetic hegemony 
at least). Here, Hobbes’ politics (and the aesthetic analogue of 
Hobbes’ politics) are greatly strengthened by reference to the 
more contemporary forms of the political realism of theorists 
like Carl Schmitt and the Lenin of the Russian Revolution, both 
of whom follow Hobbes in some measure, adjusted to the greater 
complexities and deepening disenchantment of the modern world. 
I should add that Hobbes is hardly an arbitrary figure. He appears 
at the start of modern political history: in particular, with regard to 
the mortal insecurity of the state and its aggregated citizenry and 
the significance of favouring prudential values over the usual moral 
values of Church and Monarchy.
In fact, the entire history of Western politics, from the sixteenth 
century to the present, has effectively eliminated the determinacy 
of any rule of sovereignty, the demonstrable constitutionality of 
law, the primary political function of moral truths, the would-
be “rule of law” itself, and the universal consensus or assured 
validity of the true objectives of political life. Imagine! All that is 
gone now – or reduced to utopian pronouncements that have all 
but lost their strictest function. Contemporary politics is guided, 
rather, by the temporal drift of prudential interests regarding the 
collective power and security of a constitutive people and the 
legible declension of evolving practice. We proceed by prudential 
habitude, but argue from principle. Nevertheless, security is 
existential, mortal, immediately compelling, primordial, ultimate, 
unsettling, consensually committed beyond any determinate rules; 
and the creativity of the entire run of the geistlich world – endlessly 
and diversely productive, expressive, aesthetically engaged, 
interpretively responsive – cannot be more than allusively confined, 
as we’ve just witnessed, in coming to understand Picasso as the 
vaunted “painter of modern life.” Expression is the existential 
voice that anticipates political commitment: the “theory of 
interpretation,” therefore, cannot fail to accord with the “theory of 
human practices.” But that is of course the Hobbesian aesthetic: the 
drift from would-be foundational rules (or laws) to opportunistic 
(but prudential) habitudes. Picasso is, for a longish time, our 
principal exemplar – disputed (but often, even uncomprehendingly, 
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followed by gifted and ungifted artists alike) into an increasingly 
disenchanted world of chance marketable expression.
Wherever the supposed rules of painting are enforced (as, self-
deceptively, among the academic salons of nineteenth-century 
France), we have only to invent (it seems) a maverick canon, abandon 
the older rules, and vie for one or another form of entrepreneurial 
hegemony. The surprising success of an entire family of cubisms 
provides the compelling evidence; and the wary competition 
between Picasso and Matisse confirms the uncertainty of its market 
life. It may be that our world is changing too quickly to live by strict 
rules. My own surmise favours instead Wittgenstein’s thoroughly 
unbewildred pronouncement: “When I obey a rule,” Wittgenstein 
observes, “I do not choose. I obey the rule blindly.”11 I find this as 
much a law of the artworld and of politics and science, as it is of 
ordinary language. Out of necessity, we live improvisationally – 
without any explicitly closed order – rationally, by approximative 
tolerances, felt but never precisely measured. We are continually 
confronted by the impossibility of human fixity. We have eclipsed 
the salient forms of rationalist closure and find ourselves beset by 
the deepening insecurities of guarding every form of information 
and possession. Every age will have its own politics and interpretive 
zeal. Ours, on the edge of the most daring (most inviting and most 
dangerous) technologies ever imagined, is obliged to eclipse the 
proprieties of all past forms of expression and commitment that the 
race has ever conceived. Part, but only part, of this is centred on the 
fear of the robotic and the cyborg.
Politically, I think it very possible that the third phase of our 
extended history will favour a range of totalitarian closure with 
no more than a dwindling tolerance of democratic liberty that may 
meet some of Hobbes’ up-dated security concerns. In that case, 
such themes (and the treatment of such themes) as are favoured in 
Picasso’s Demoiselles and (say) Guernica may prove prophetic for 
a season. In any event, something of the kind is indeed the key to 
the convergence of the political and the aesthetic as the world made 
its turn into the twentieth century. I find it more than plausibly 
confirmed by the Second World War and the deepening turn into 
the twenty-first century.
To be entirely candid: What I sense here is the increasing 
rationalization of large parts of the production of managed truths 
regarding political, economic, medical, moral, religious, artistic, 
scientific, and allied forms of information and property, increasingly 
difficult to examine and test directly in any independently 
confirmable ways – locally or reliably – at the same time our 
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expressive capacities are directed to responding meaningfully to 
the world as it is thus presented. (Very often, even now, we cannot 
say whether we are inside or outside the bureaucratic “camp” – 
which is to say: we are “inside”). There may even be competing 
systems of such political spaces, state-centred or not.
III
The twentieth century produced two very large, disastrous 
experiments involving competing such systems: the Hitlerian and 
the Stalinist. The twenty-first century appears ready to provide 
a wider interpenetrating network of both large and small such 
ventures, with the distinct possibility that the larger variety may 
actually prove more successful (and more congenial) than the 
totalitarianisms of the last century.
The problem requires the invention of more stable and more 
reliable ways of breaching the forms of totalitarian closure. Call 
that would-be resolution, “social democracy” (new form). I cannot 
see how the third phase of our political history can escape (at its 
most fortunate) a contest (or confrontation) between totalitarian 
closure and the relative openness of social democracy (new form); 
and I cannot see any assurance that totalitarianism will be benignly 
contained. One of the most extreme predictions of this sort appears 
in Agamben’s Homo Sacer: the prophecy that the paradigmatic 
political space of our age will not be the emancipated city but the 
concentration camp. It may not make much difference if the model 
is to be no more than the marginally democratized totalitarian 
state itself. In that event, both the solution and resistance to such 
a solution will appear as Hobbesian options favoured in much 
the same way. What emerges is the dawning sense of how the 
existential nature of our new technologies will impact the artistic 
and the aesthetic and the mundane political. There cannot be any 
convincing disjunction between the cognitive (or the discursive) 
and the existential condition of each. The “existential” forms of 
historicity will persist with a vengeance; and every pertinent effort 
to constrain our “technological daring” will (I conjecture) have to 
come to terms with the “rational appeal” of totalitarianism. There’s 
the point of entertaining the revival of the socialist “imaginary.”
I do also mean what I say about the disappearance of sovereignty 
and the impossibility of solving the ultimate constitutional 
question. We are now, I would say, on the edge of the third phase 
of a political history that, for reasons linked to the changing needs 
of an acceleratingly technologized age, appears to favour the 
seeming security of populist and totalitarian closure. Expression 
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in the geistlich world may be expected to draw its own hegemonies 
from that elementary but inevitably deceptive fact. Here, you 
begin to glimpse the plausibility of a theory of interpretation (as 
well as of artistic production) of the entire (ultimately indivisible) 
run of civilizational concerns – legal, religious, educational, 
moral, medical, artistic, hermeneutic – that collects the whole of 
our “spiritual” world and presupposes the cultural entwinement 
of the political and the aesthetic. It’s the primacy and increasingly 
technologized dangers of the existential world that we anticipate – a 
giant step beyond Marxian economism. I cannot see the likelihood 
of salvaging any form of socialist democracy before we come to 
grips with the pacification of our growing fears; and I expect that 
the arts themselves will increasingly feature such concerns.
What already marks the naiveté of Hobbes’ rationalist 
contract is the fiction of a discernible and changeless ground-rule 
(Gründnorm, in Hans Kelsen’s idiom) that vouchsafes any and every 
would-be legislative system. There may well have been a need for 
the illusion of such a rule, but there can be none in a thoroughly 
historied world (our own). There’s the failure of rationalism and 
transcendentalism. The sense of constancy in change is all we 
have and all we could ever apply – in politics or the artworld or the 
whole of human practice; and the artworld confirms the viability 
of the liberty it engenders. There’s the ultimate virtue of what I’m 
calling the Hobbesian aesthetic, most memorably manifested in 
the delayed revolution of post-academic painting in nineteenth-
century France, possibly the best expression of the true liberté of 
the French Revolution, construed holistically or organically, as the 
quality of a viable state.
The political, more than the moral, possibly because of its 
continually mortal risks, has produced in our time some ingenious 
(seemingly necessary) conceptual innovations of a realist sort that 
appear not to have been needed earlier with the same urgency that, 
say, surfaced with the advent of that profoundly self-contradictory 
event – at once fatally successful and unquestionably failed – that, 
changeably characterized, we know as the Russian Revolution. In 
short, I take the political and the spiritual (the aesthetic, if you wish) 
to be the twin monitors of our societal well-being, sensed somewhat 
subliminally in other than principled discursive ways – creaturely 
ways, I think we may say – existentially, whether accurately or not, 
by means of what have come to be called “social imaginaries.” In 
my opinion, this begins to suggest a quite plausible way of rescuing 
John Dewey’s notion of a “problematic situation” (politically 
as well as individually, along existential lines): the effect, let us 
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say, of transforming what may be described as animal prudence 
rendered political by the unique powers of mastering language – a 
post-Darwinian reading of the bond between Hobbes and Dewey, 
globalized, possibly even a post-pragmatist pragmatism.12
Aggregated agency in the political sense gathers force 
spontaneously, to ensure the continuing life of an organized cohort 
of citizens viewed as a collective body; agentive imagination at the 
juncture of the political and the spiritual often provides no more 
than dream-like glimpses of the meaning of our actual forms of life. 
(The artworld always has a surfeit of uncommitted energy). In that 
sense, the expression and interpretation of our collective identity 
can afford to remain relatively latent (though easily awakened) in the 
studio and museum. (It rarely strays far from the political). Nearly 
all that we say and do obliquely involves that identity. There’s the 
clue to the social integrity of any sizable aggregate of self-directed 
lives. We absorb the culture of our homeland and we are thereby 
effectively primed for possible political engagement, as well as 
for the interpretation of our culture. (The two go hand in hand). 
The articulation of the political yields a fresh theory of art and the 
interpretation of art. Its best contribution is that of the dawning 
sufficiency of practice itself: there is no higher normativity to be 
had. There’s the force of historicity.
I’m inclined to think that the globalized insecurities of our 
world have been pointedly reawakened in recent years, have 
begun to rally meaningfully again, with a force and direction that 
cannot yet be satisfactorily deciphered. Totalitarian, even fascist, 
fears run through the Western world more insistently now than 
in recent years. Inchoate currents, the increased incipience of 
“social imaginaries” may already anticipate the start of a new age. 
An up-dated Hobbesian innovation, mediated by such politically 
active figures as Lenin, Schmitt, Antonio Gramsci and, in a more 
academic mode, Giorgio Agamben and Ernesto Laclau, similarly 
attracted to Hobbes in the geistlich sense, have indeed confronted 
the totalitarian option realistically, as well as that of post-Marxian 
socialism, in terms that now require the novel realisms of the 
“imaginaries,” which of course, are actual but reduced realist 
options – “possibilities,” say – not easily distinguished from one 
another within the “hegemony” of some (contrived) leadership 
that is unlikely to succeed without their explicit support. (This, 
of course, is the decisive lesson of the Russian Revolution that 
frightened Europe so badly: the onset of Stalin’s opportunism, 
given the failed “hegemony” of the Leninist coup: the absence of 
an adequate cohort of revolutionaries or of a suitable imaginary). 
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Our political (and artistic) future has already been partially limned. 
We must play out the hand we’ve dealt ourselves.
The earlier defeat – if I may now call it that – in the nineteenth 
century, of French academic painting, primed by the initiatives 
of Manet and his contemporaries and successors, who plied their 
professional skills entrepreneurially, reminds us that artistic 
imagination was and is now obliged to create a loyal audience for 
its altered fashions, at the same time it seeks to sell its wares in 
the open market. The “hegemonies” of the Hobbesian aesthetic 
continually alter the mapping of our existential world. Picasso is 
its most stunning – late – exemplar.
Social imaginaries are the relatively stable collective presences 
with which a “hegemonic” (ideologically dominant) power (in 
either politics or art or elsewhere) may realistically consider 
an accommodating alliance by which to advance the fortunes 
of cooperating (usually transient) “collectives” in an effort to 
displace the competing objectives of ventures opposed to the 
new initiative. The openness, the creative tolerance, say, of the 
world of post-academic painting, in France, in the latter half of 
the nineteenth century, is more easily supported than specifically 
political imaginaries – but it is also often more difficult to interpret 
accurately in hegemonic terms. It may contribute nevertheless to an 
ethos hospitable to expressive and potentially political innovations 
with regard to our existential world. The idea of an intertwining of 
the political and the aesthetic yields a very plausible (and ample) 
sketch of the shifting historical orientation of contemporary 
commitment and expressive imagination ranging over the whole of 
our civilizational concerns – collected in every possible way against 
the closure of the totalitarian. I intend all of this informally, but not 
without conviction. That’s to say, the Hobbesian aesthetic is itself 
a prescient political “imaginary” on the edge of a new encounter 
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